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Abstract 
Nigeria experienced the Global Financial Crisis as a dramatic decline in the price of crude 
oil and a burst stock market bubble. These losses were compounded by a high level of 
margin lending, resulting in large numbers of nonperforming loans (NPLs) for Nigerian 
banks. The government established the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria 
(AMCON) in July 2010 to purchase NPLs and inject capital into insolvent banks. AMCON 
injected a total of ₦2.3 trillion (US$15.3 billion) in capital into eight different financial 
institutions. Five capital injections were designed to bring failing banks to zero net asset 
value and allow them to remain open before their acquisition and further recapitalization 
by a third-party investor. The three remaining injections were made into purchase-and-
assumption-style bridge banks, with the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation acting as 
receiver. Bridge banks purchased and assumed the assets and liabilities of failed banks 
unable to achieve the minimum capital requirement. As a result of its operations, AMCON 
accumulated a negative equity position of ₦3.6 trillion (US$24 billion) by the end of 2014. 
Observers have highlighted the uncertainty surrounding AMCON’s ability to cover its losses 
from funds recovered through the resolution of NPLs, returns on its equity investments, 
and the ₦1.5 trillion (US$10 billion) dedicated to its operations through the Banking Sector 
Resolution Cost Fund. 
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At a Glance  
During the years leading up to the Global 
Financial Crisis, Nigerian banks fueled a 
rapid credit expansion to the private 
sector. Most notably, banks supplied large 
quantities of margin loans and 
investments in the oil and gas sector. 
The situation became unsustainable as the 
financial crisis spread around the globe. 
The crash of the domestic stock market in 
March 2008 and the rapid decline of oil 
and gas prices affected the balance sheets 
of many banks in Nigeria, resulting in a 
high level of nonperforming loans (NPLs) 
in the sector. In response, Nigerian 
authorities set up the Asset Management 
Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) during 
the summer of 2010. A public corporation, 
owned jointly by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) and the Ministry of Finance, 
AMCON’s mandate was to “acquire [NPLs] 
from [Nigerian] banks and annex the 
underlying collateral, [as well as] fill the 
remaining capital deficiency and receive 
equity and/or preferred shares in the 
affected banks as consideration.” AMCON 
intervened in eight financial institutions, 
injecting a total of ₦2.3 trillion. Five 
injections were made into failing banks 
that arranged an acquisition by a third-
party investor. The remaining three banks 
could not achieve the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) of 10% required by 
the CBN and thus had their assets and liabilities transferred to bridge banks. This approach 
was meant to give the authorities time to seek an acquirer. AMCON become the full owner 
of these three bridge banks. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: AMCON was established “to acquire 
[NPLs] from [Nigerian] banks and annex the 
underlying collateral, [. . .] fill the remaining capital 
deficiency and receive equity and/or preferred 
shares in the affected banks as consideration” 
(Makanjuola 2015) 
Announcement Date January 28, 2010 
(first public hearing 
on the AMCON Act) 
Operational Date July 19, 2010 
(signed into law) 
Sunset Date August 5, 2011 
(injection into 
bridge banks) 
Program Size ₦2.3 trillion 
(US$15.3 billion) 
Peak Utilization ₦2.3 trillion 
(US$15.3 billion) 




Key Features Created bridge bank 
structure to 
accommodate 
institutions that did 
not meet initial 
deadline 
Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria 
(AMCON) Capital Injections 
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Summary Evaluation 
AMCON’s capital injections were successful in protecting depositors and ensuring the 
continuation of business in each of the eight banks. Critics have noted issues related to 
AMCON’s dependence on CBN guidelines. However, these critics focus on AMCON’s 
activities as an asset management company. AMCON’s financial performance has also been 
a case for concern. Most of its losses were attributable to its capital injections. Through 
loan acquisitions and bank recapitalizations, the agency accumulated a negative equity 
position of ₦3.6 trillion by the end of 2014. During the following year, AMCON’s CEO 
announced that the corporation had resolved 57% of the acquired loans, recovering a total 
of ₦1 trillion. While encouraging, the announcement did not remove the uncertainty 
regarding AMCON’s ability to cover losses incurred without requiring further government 
support. 
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Nigeria Context 2009–2010 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$291.9 billion in 2009 
$361.5 billion in 2010 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$1,891 in 2009 
$2,280 in 2010 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt) 
Data for 2009: 
S&P: B+ 
Fitch: BB 
Moody’s: Not available 
Data for 2010: 
S&P: B+ 
Fitch: BB 
Moody’s: Not available 
Size of banking system $72.2 billion in 2009 
$79.0 billion in 2010 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
25% of 2009 GDP 
22% of 2010 GDP 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
Data not available in 2009 
Data not available in 2010 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 81.7% in 2009 
66.5% in 2010 
Foreign involvement in banking system 5.0% in 2009 
14.0% in 2010 
Government ownership of banking system Data not available in 2009 
Data not available in 2010 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes, in 2009 
Up to $3,328 via Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation in 2010 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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In the early 2000s, the Nigerian banking sector underwent major structural reforms. In 
2004, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced a plan to strengthen the country’s 
fragmented financial sector through consolidation (Alford 2010). The CBN justified the 
policy with the need to “grow the banks and position them to play pivotal roles in driving 
development across the sectors of the economy” (Sanusi 2011). The CBN mandated that all 
banks increase their paid-up capital from ₦2 billion (US$13 million) to ₦25 billion (US$166 
million).4 The policy was announced just one month after Charles Soludo took office as the 
new governor of the CBN in June 2004. Banks had until December 2005, a period of roughly 
18 months, to reach the new minimum required capital (Alford 2010). The announcement 
forced several mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the banking sector. Of the 89 licensed 
privately owned banks active in Nigeria in 2005, 25 emerged. Ultimately, the CBN revoked 
the licenses of 13 banks due to their inability to reach the mandated capital level in time 
(Osuji 2012). 
Following the consolidation, Nigerian banks fueled a rapid credit expansion to the private 
sector (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Banks invested most of the funds in the country’s 
natural resources sector and in margin loans for the purchase of domestic stocks, making 
them increasingly exposed to oil and stock prices (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Makanjuola 
2016). The expansion of margin lending fueled a five-fold increase in the total 
capitalization of the Nigerian stock market between 2004 and 2007 (Osuji 2012; 
Makanjuola 2016). The domestic All-Share Index reached its high of 66,162 points on 
March 3, 2008, and then fell 70% in the following 12 months (Nigerian Stock Exchange 
1996–2021). Oil prices tanked as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) reduced demand around 
the globe. The combined oil and equity price shocks affected the balance sheets of many 
banks in Nigeria and led to a rapid increase in nonperforming loans (NPLs) to margin 
investors and oil companies (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
Policymakers became aware of the magnitude of the problems facing the Nigerian financial 
sector through a special examination of the banking sector conducted jointly by the Nigeria 
Deposit Insurance Company (NDIC) and the CBN in June 2009 (CBN 2010a). The report, 
published on August 14, 2009, revealed 10 banks to be either undercapitalized or insolvent 
(Alford 2010; Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The report also highlighted the banks’ “excessive 
risk-taking and ineffective risk management, weak internal control mechanisms, undue 
focus on short-term gains, lack of Board and management capacity, conflicts of interest, and 
excessive executive compensation” (Makanjuola 2016). The conclusions of the examination 
 
4 The exchange rate used throughout—₦150 for US$1—is the average exchange rate between 2009 and 2011, 
using annual data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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made clear that several Nigerian banks needed to be recapitalized. The CBN intervened, 
quickly and decisively, following the outcome of the examination.  
The conclusions resulted in an immediate capital injection totaling ₦420 billion into five 
banks—Oceanic Bank, Union Bank Nigeria, Afribank, FinBank, and Intercontinental Bank. 
These banks were identified as insolvent and “chronic borrowers at the Expanded Discount 
Window (EDW) of the CBN indicating that they had little cash on hand”5 (Alford 2010). 
Audits of the remaining five banks were completed by October 3, 2009 (Alford 2010). 
Results of the audits are shown in Figure 1. The CBN said it would inject an additional ₦200 
billion into Bank PHB, Springbank, Equitorial Trust Bank, and Wema Bank—increasing the 
number of intervened banks to nine (CBN 2009). The CBN subsequently lent ₦247 billion to 
the four banks (CBN 2010a). CBN removed the managing directors of eight of the nine 
banks that received injections—all but Wema Bank, which had just replaced its 
management in June 2009 (CBN 2009). A tenth bank, Unity Bank, was also determined to 
be insolvent but “had sufficient liquidity to meet its current obligations” and did thus not 
receive additional capital (Alford 2010). CBN ordered Wema Bank and Unity Bank to 
recapitalize by June 30, 2010 (CBN 2009). By the end of 2009, Equitorial Trust Bank had 
repaid its ₦30 billion debt but was still in need of a merger partner. At the end of 2009, 
CBN’s outstanding loans to the remaining eight banks stood at ₦637 billion (CBN 2010a). 
Figure 1: Overview of CBN Recapitalizations as of December 31, 2009 
Bank Amount [₦ billion] 
Intercontinental Bank 100 
Union Bank Nigeria 120 
Wema Bank 87 
Oceanic Bank 100 
FinBank 50 




Source: CBN 2010a).   
 
5 The discount window (DW) is the Central Bank of Nigeria’s lending facility through which it provides 
lender-of-last-resort services to Nigerian financial institutions. The DW was expanded in 2008 to accept state 
bonds and commercial papers as collateral. 
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The central bank wrote off these loans in full in 2009 and 2010 but retained them on its 
books (CBN 2010a). In 2011, the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) took 
over those debts in the course of recapitalizing the banks (CBN 2012). 
To ensure continued confidence in the banking sector, the central bank guaranteed all 
interbank lending transactions until December 2011 (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). In June 
2011, CBN stated that, in order to keep their banking licenses, all intervened banks would 
be required to reach the mandated minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 10% by 
September 30, 2011 (Chew and Dijkman 2013). 
Program Description 
The Nigerian authorities decided to establish a new agency to provide further support to 
the banking system. The government decided to establish a new entity because there was 
no rapidly available mechanism to inject more public funds into capital deficient banks, and 
legal challenges remained regarding the NDIC’s ability to wind up failed banks (Cerruti and 
Neyens 2016). The Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Act was signed into law in 
July 2010 by the president, Goodluck Jonathan, officially establishing AMCON as Nigeria’s 
public asset management company (AMC). The act mandated AMCON to inject capital and 
purchase nonperforming and systemically important loans (Makanjuola 2016). 
The AMCON Act stipulated rules on governance and transparency. Regarding governance, 
the statute required particular levels of experience and disallowed potential conflicts of 
interest. Measures for transparency in operations included the requirement to submit 
annual reports to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and CBN and quarterly reports to the 
parliament, in addition to publishing annual reports. However, the act did not include 
financial safeguards that would limit the government’s exposure to potential losses, as 
AMCON’s only shareholder. “There [were] no provisions to limit the amount of assets or 
equity that AMCON [could] purchase or the bonds to be issued, no leverage ratio, and no 
requirement to maintain a minimum amount of equity” (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). AMCON 
was thinly capitalized with paid-in capital of ₦10 billion for asset acquisitions and 
recapitalizations totaling more than ₦4 trillion (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
The CBN launched this recapitalization process for the intervened banks in December 
2009, before AMCON had been begun to operate. The CBN’s strategy relied on third-party 
investors to acquire failing banks and ensure continued operations. AMCON’s role was to 
inject capital into intervened banks in the final stages of the M&A process to facilitate the 
deal once a failing bank had signed a transaction implementation agreement (TIA) with an 
interested acquirer (Makanjuola 2016). In practice, this was achieved through injections of 
zero-coupon bonds with discounted values sufficient to return banks’ net asset values 
(NAVs) to zero (Makanjuola 2016).  
In addition to the bridge bank solution, the CBN considered three alternatives. Direct 
nationalization was thought to be difficult to implement, as it would have required 
additional legislation to be enacted. The CBN also opposed liquidation by the NDIC, 
motivated by concerns that it would negatively affect the recovering economy. A revocation 
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of the banking licenses was opposed for the same reasons as it would have led to forced 
liquidation by the NDIC as well (Makanjuola 2016). The bridge bank option was thus 
deemed to be the most desirable. 
The mergers and acquisitions process that the CBN launched in December 2009 followed a 
predetermined series of steps: 
(1) Confirmation of interest: Identification of interested investors; 
(2) Investor evaluation: Shortlisting of investors and execution of nondisclosure 
agreements; 
(3) Initial due diligence: Accountants’ reports and interaction with senior management; 
(4) Submission of nonbinding offers: Final shortlist of participants and submission of 
nonbinding offers; 
(5) Final offers: Detailed due diligence and reception of final offers; 
(6) Evaluate bids: Review and evaluation of final offers and follow-up discussion; 
(7) Discussion and recommendation of bids: Discussion of course of action and 
finalizing of decision on preferred investor; 
(8) Entering into exclusive negotiations: Exclusive negotiations with the preferred 
investor and finalization of a memorandum of understanding (MOU); and 
(9) Approval and AMCON capital injection: Signing of TIA and securing all necessary 
approvals, then AMCON capital injection (Makanjuola 2016). 
The new management teams and boards of undercapitalized banks played an integral role 
in the process, supported by financial advisors. CBN and AMCON helped them find 
investors to ensure that all banks could recapitalize before the September 30, 2011, 
deadline (Makanjuola 2016). During the recapitalization process leading up to the deadline, 
all eight banks had negative equity and were kept as going concerns through the Tier II 
capital injected by the CBN in 2009 (CBN 2011c). Banks that were unable to make sufficient 
progress toward a deal became bridge banks, following a CBN meeting on June 13, 2011 
(Makanjuola 2016). In the Nigerian context, a bridge bank is “a temporary full-service 
government-owned bank licensed by the CBN but otherwise fully operated by the NDIC” 
(Makanjuola 2016). The NDIC Act (2006, sec. 39) outlined the bridge bank resolution 
process. 
Wema Bank, which the CBN had supported in the initial recapitalization in 2009, was able 
to avoid participating in the AMCON recapitalization. It recapitalized in 2010 with the help 
of a ₦20 billion asset sale to AMCON and a ₦7.5 billion capital raise from private investors. 
The CBN also waived ₦37 billion of Wema Bank’s original ₦87 billion loan; this appears to 
be the only instance in which CBN waived a bank’s debt. Unlike the other banks, Wema 
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continued to owe CBN a portion of its original loan, totaling ₦50 billion, at the end of 2011 
(CBN 2011b). Wema Bank subsequently applied for a regional banking license. Under CBN 
regulations, regional banks have lower capital requirements, which ensured Wema could 
continue operating without further support (CBN 2010b; CBN 2011a). 
Outcomes 
In total, eight Nigerian banks were involved in AMCON’s recapitalization process in 2011. 
Five banks were able to find acquirers and signed a TIA with their acquirers before the 
deadline (Makanjuola 2016). To facilitate the deal, AMCON injected capital into each 
institution to offset their negative equity—in other words, to adjust their net asset values 
to zero prior to acquisition (Makanjuola 2016). 
Three other banks failed to make satisfactory progress toward a recapitalization deal 
before the deadline, and their banking licenses were revoked by the CBN. As a result, the 
three failed banks had their assets and liabilities transferred to newly created bridge banks. 
To ensure the new institutions were viable, AMCON provided a capital injection into each of 
the banks—becoming their full owner and only shareholder (Makanjuola 2016). Figure 2 
provides a summary of AMCON’s capital injections into these eight intervened banks.  
Figure 2: Overview of AMCON Capital Injections 
Bank New Name 
Amount 
[₦ billion] 2011 Acquirer  Final Acquirer 
Intercontinental Bank N/A 562 Access Bank N/A 
Union Bank Nigeria N/A 383 African Capital Alliance N/A 
Equitorial Trust Bank N/A 65 Sterling Bank N/A 
Oceanic Bank N/A 305 Ecobank Transnational N/A 
FinBank N/A 155 First City Monument Bank N/A 
Bank PHB Keystone 301 AMCON Sigma Golf/Riverbank 
Afribank Mainstreet 426 AMCON Skye Bank 
Springbank Enterprise 135 AMCON Heritage Bank 
Total  2,332   
Source: AMCON 2012, 16. 
Further, it was decided that AMCON’s capital injection would occur only after the licenses 
of the failed banks had been revoked and new licenses for the bridge banks had been 
issued. This setup ensured that “AMCON would not [acquire] anything directly from [failing 
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institutions . . .] and [was] thus not susceptible to any action at the instance of shareholders 
of the failing insured institutions” (Makanjuola 2016). 
Overall, AMCON’s capital injections produced most of the agency’s reported losses from the 
early years of its operations (AMCON 2012). When AMCON’s public accounts were issued 
at the end of 2011, its first year of operations, the statements revealed a negative equity 
position of ₦2.36 trillion (AMCON 2012). AMCON’s recapitalization efforts and subsequent 
write-downs accounted for 88% of this total (AMCON 2012). 
AMCON contributed a total of ₦1.47 trillion to bring the five intervened banks back to zero 
NAV (AMCON 2012). By the end of 2011, AMCON had to write down 91.06% of the 
investment, leaving it with ₦118 billion. Similarly, AMCON wrote down 88.49% of the 
equity it acquired in the three bridge banks. As of December 31, 2011, AMCON reported a 
combined NAV of ₦99 billion for the three banks. Its initial investment was ₦861 billion 
(AMCON 2012). Figure 3 provides a detailed breakdown of the various injections and 
write-downs. 




Source: AMCON 2012, 16. 
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II. Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: AMCON’s policy package included the acquisition of 
nonperforming loans and the recapitalization of undercapitalized banks. 
AMCON’s operations followed earlier interventions by the CBN intended to stabilize the 
financial sector. These interventions included capital injections into nine banks totaling 
₦667 billion in 2009 and a blanket guarantee for interbank lending until December 2011 
(CBN 2010a). AMCON was set up in 2010 to provide additional support (Cerruti and 
Neyens 2016). Out of nine banks that received support from the CBN in 2009, eight 
benefited from AMCON’s capital injections. Wema Bank, which had converted to a regional 
chapter, did not require additional support (CBN 2010b; CBN 2011a). AMCON’s mandate 
was broad and encompassed both the role of a public AMC and a capital injection vehicle 
(Cerruti and Neyens 2016). As an AMC, AMCON’s operations included the acquisition and 
resolution of eligible banking sector assets, such as nonperforming loans or other 
designated assets (Makanjuola 2016; see Ungersboeck and Runkel 2021). 
2. Legal Authority: AMCON was established under the AMCON Act. 
A first draft of the AMCON Act was forwarded to the Senate in November 2004 as a part of 
the measures taken to strengthen the financial sector. At the time, the proposal 
encountered strong pushback from opponents of the banking consolidation agenda and did 
not gain the necessary traction. The idea was revived in 2009 following a special 
examination of Nigerian banks, focusing policymakers’ attention on the fragility of the 
domestic banking sector. A first public hearing on the bill was held at the House of 
Representatives on January 28, 2010. After a second reading, the House enacted the bill on 
March 10, 2010. The Nigerian Senate passed the bill on May 5, 2010. President Goodluck 
Jonathan signed the AMCON Act into law on July 19, 2010 (Makanjuola 2016). Among other 
functions,6 the AMCON Act empowered the agency to “purchase or invest in eligible 
equities” (AMCON Act 2010, sec. 5).  
AMCON was fully owned by the federal government, with its ₦10 billion paid-in capital split 
evenly between the Ministry of Finance and the CBN (Makanjuola 2016). The cash helped 
cover AMCON’s initial operating costs (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
 
6 Other functions specified in the act included: acquire eligible bank assets, purchase or invest in eligible 
equities, manage or dispose of eligible bank assets, issue and redeem bonds and debt securities for the 
consideration of assets, and attempt to recognize maximum value on the resolution of acquired bank assets 
(AMCON Act, sec. 5). Ungersboeck and Runkel (2021) discuss these powers in detail. 
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3. Legal Authority: AMCON had the authority to transfer assets and liabilities of 
banks that failed to qualify for the recapitalization program to a bridge bank 
under the NDIC Act of 2006. 
The AMCON Act provided the authority to allow AMCON to support the five intervened 
banks in their acquisition deals by returning them to zero NAV (Makanjuola 2016). 
However, the bridge bank solution implemented to rescue the remaining three failing 
banks required the triggering of Sections 38(1; c) and 39 of the NDIC Act of 2006 
(Makanjuola 2016). Section 38 (1; c) established the guidelines for the management and 
restructuring of failing financial institutions and designated the NDIC, with the consultation 
of the CBN, the ability to arrange the transfer of deposit liabilities by another insured 
institution (NDIC Act 2006, sec. 38). Section 39 provided the NDIC the authority to 
establish bridge banks (NDIC Act 2006, sec. 39). 
4. Communication: The authorities’ communication strategy focused on ensuring a 
smooth transition for the three failed banks that became bridge banks. The 
communication strategy was implemented jointly by the NDIC and CBN. 
The communication strategy during the intervention was primarily focused on removing 
the uncertainty surrounding the transition of the three failed banks to AMCON-owned 
bridge banks. The strategy was executed jointly by the NDIC and CBN (Makanjuola 2016). 
The announcements were centered on August 6, 2011, the first day the bridge banks 
operated as fully licensed banks (Makanjuola 2016). The communication strategy was laid 
out in a report issued to the NDIC (Makanjuola 2016). The plan highlighted the importance 
of a public announcement by the NDIC confirming that “it would continue to insure all 
depositors migrating to the Bridge Banks” (Makanjuola 2016). At the same time, a press 
statement by the CBN was planned to provide “a full faith solvency guarantee and credit 
assurance for all bridge banks” (Makanjuola 2016). Finally, the communication plan 
ensured more specific communication with “overseas regulators, foreign creditors [and] 
rating agencies” (Makanjuola 2016). 
5. Governance: AMCON was governed by a 10-member board of directors. 
AMCON’s board of directors consisted of four executive directors and six nonexecutive 
members (AMCON Act 2010, sec. 10). The Nigerian Senate approved the 10 nominees on 
November 3, 2010. The board was led by Mustafa Chike-Obi as AMCON’s CEO (Makanjuola 
2016). The CBN had considerable power over the board, as it nominated all four executive 
directors, including the CEO, as well as two nonexecutive members, for a total of six 
nominations (Makanjuola 2016). The Ministry of Finance nominated three nonexecutive 
members, including the chairman of the board, while the last member was nominated by 
the NDIC (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Makanjuola 2016). All directors were nominated for 
five-year terms with a possible reappointment to a second five-year term (Makanjuola 
2016). The AMCON Act further specified that board members should have at least “10 years 
[of] cognate financial experience at a senior management level, . . . have no conflict of 
interest with AMCON’s business, and disclose debt obligations and interest” (AMCON Act 
2010; Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Makanjuola 2016). 
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6. Administration: Prior to the start of AMCON’s operations, the AMCON 
Implementation Committee (AMCON-IC) devised a work plan for the 
establishment of the agency. 
The AMCON-IC met on six occasions between May and August 2010. As many as 30 people 
attended meetings (Makanjuola 2016, 96, 100). During the first meeting, participants 
included management consultants and legal and financial advisors from the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, Deutsche Bank, Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc, 
Chapel Hill Advisory Partners Limited, Olaniwun Ajayi LP, Kola Awodein & Company, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Subsequent meetings saw the addition of participants 
representing various Nigerian and international institutions including the Ministry of 
Finance, the Debt Management Office (DMO), the [Nigerian] Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Makanjuola 2016). The 
work plan devised by the committee included, among other items, staff recruitment, 
securing office locations, determining a valuation methodology for NPLs, and exploring 
funding options for AMCON. The draft bill establishing AMCON was modeled after Ireland’s 
National Asset Management Agency and Malaysia’s Danaharta. These agencies were 
mandated to acquire NPLs during the GFC and the Asian Financial Crisis, respectively 
(Makanjuola 2016). 
7. Timing: The CBN set a deadline for recapitalization of September 30, 2011. 
For the five banks that were able to sign a TIA before the September 30, 2011, deadline 
imposed by the CBN, the injection occurred after an agreement with a potential acquirer 
had been signed and shortly before the conclusion of the merger deal (Makanjuola 2016). 
These injections were timed in such a manner that the intervened institutions had zero 
NAVs at the time of the acquisitions. For the three banks that failed to find an acquirer and 
did thus not make satisfactory progress toward a recapitalization before the deadline, the 
injections occurred in early August 2011, as the banks’ boards of directors were taken over 
by the NDIC and their assets and liabilities transferred to bridge banks (Makanjuola 2016). 
8. Eligible Institutions: Eligible financial institutions included banks licensed by the 
CBN to undertake the business of banking in Nigeria as well as banks or financial 
institutions whose licenses had been revoked. 
The definition of eligible financial institution (EFI) was provided in the guidelines issued to 
AMCON by the CBN and included banks licensed by the CBN to undertake the business of 
banking in Nigeria as well as banks or financial institutions whose licenses had been 
revoked (AMCON Guidelines No. 1 2010). The guidelines focus on AMCON’s role as an asset 
management corporation. While participation in the asset acquisition program was 
strongly incentivized under the guidelines, participation in the capital injection program 
was dictated by a bank’s ability to achieve the 10% CAR position required by the CBN 
deadline (AMCON Guidelines No. 1, 7). Sixteen of the 24 EFIs were sufficiently capitalized, 
five banks were undercapitalized but able to arrange an acquisition, and three banks were 
undercapitalized and had to be acquired by AMCON. 
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9. Size: AMCON based its total ₦2.3 trillion size on each institution’s capital 
position. 
In total, AMCON injected ₦2.3 trillion into eight banks (AMCON 2012). This sum was 
determined by calculating how much debt each bank would need to reach a net asset value 
of zero (Makanjuola 2016, tables 6.4 and 6.7). 
10. Source of Funding: Funding for the operations was provided through the Banking 
Sector Resolution Cost Fund (RCF) and AMCON-issued, government-guaranteed, 
zero-coupon bonds.  
The RCF was a ₦1.5 trillion sinking fund financed through contributions by Nigerian 
financial institutions and the Central Bank of Nigeria. It was intended to fund AMCON’s loan 
acquisition and recapitalization activities (Makanjuola 2016). 
The bonds were issued in five series between December 31, 2010, and December 28, 2011. 
Figure 4 depicts AMCON’s bond issuances. While AMCON managed to retire about one-
third of its bonds by 2014, the remainder was refinanced by the CBN. The arrangement 
provided that the CBN invested ₦3.6 trillion in AMCON bonds in order to refinance the 
agency’s exposure (Mazen 2013). The bonds were guaranteed by the Nigerian government 
and qualified as eligible investments for the CBN and pension funds. They could also be 
traded on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (AMCON 2012). To address their liquidity needs, 
banks used the bonds to access the CBN discount window, where the bonds served as 
collateral (CBN 2015). 
Figure 4: A Breakdown of AMCON Bond Issuances 
Source: AMCON 2012, 33. 
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In 2015, the CBN reported that “AMCON redeemed the Series 1, 2, 3 and 4 Bonds […] held 
by banks, valued at ₦1.04 trillion, [using its] internally-generated funds and the 
outstanding balance in the Banking Sector Resolution Cost Sinking Fund.” A further ₦3.8 
trillion of bonds held by the CBN were restructured into a 10-year bond with a 6% coupon 
(CBN 2015). 
11. Individual Participation Limits: Each bank’s net asset value dictated the amount 
to be injected. 
Makanjuola (2016) explains that bidders would not invest in a bank with a negative net 
asset value. Therefore, AMCON injected bonds sufficient to increase a bank’s NAV to zero 
(Makanjuola 2016, tables 6.4 and 6.7). As such, the amount required to float a bank’s NAV 
acted both as an upper and lower bound on the size of AMCON’s injections. 
12. Capital Characteristics: AMCON received ordinary common shares in return for 
the zero-coupon bonds. 
The equity issued to AMCON in consideration for the zero-coupon bonds was ordinary 
common shares. In the case of the acquisition of Oceanic Bank by Ecobank Transnational 
Inc. (ETI), AMCON and Oceanic Bank legacy shareholders received ETI shares in 
consideration for their equity in Oceanic. After Oceanic was acquired by ETI, AMCON and 
Oceanic’s other shareholders were issued ordinary shares with total value of ₦38.5 billion 
and preference shares with value of ₦16.5 billion. 
13. Dividends and Pricing: Banks were recapitalized with negative equity, so shares 
paid no dividends. 
Makanjuola (2016) writes that the five intervened banks had zero intrinsic value, which 
meant that shares were priced at ₦0. Due to the (lack of) value, dividends were also not 
paid. 
14. Allocation of Losses for Existing Stakeholders: All legacy shareholders of the five 
intervened banks became shareholders of the merged entity. Legacy 
shareholders of the bridge banks were wiped out. 
In the case of the five intervened banks, shareholders received new equity in the merged 
entity. They experienced losses only to the extent that their shares were diluted following 
AMCON’s injections and the bank’s acquisition by a third party. The impact on shareholder 
value varied for each case. Details on the value of stock held by legacy shareholders are 
unavailable. Shareholders of the failed banks that were resolved through the bridge bank 
solution were wiped out as the banks were fully acquired by AMCON. In each case, AMCON 
fully absorbed the bank’s negative equity.  
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15. Fate of Existing Board and Management: AMCON did not replace management of 
any banks. 
The authorities did not further intervene in the management of the five banks that were 
able to find an acquirer (Makanjuola 2016). The boards of the failing banks were replaced 
and overseen by the NDIC. 
16. Other Conditions: Documents surveyed do not suggest that banks were subject to 
other conditions of AMCON’s capital injections. 
No documents suggest other conditions to which banks were subject as a result of 
AMCON’s capital injections. 
17. Exit Strategy: AMCON did not have an explicit exit strategy. 
The IMF has criticized AMCON for its lack of an explicit exit strategy. The Fund recognized 
the agency’s contribution in restoring stability in the banking sector. However, it voiced 
concerns regarding the absence of a sunset provision for AMCON’s activities. In a 2013 
report, the Fund recommends that a “credible exit strategy [should be] devised to ensure a 
smooth winding up of its operations by end-2017” (IMF 2013). An explicit sunset date is 
considered “important to minimize fiscal risks and avoid potential moral hazard behavior 
by the banks” (IMF 2013). The Fund reiterates its criticism in a 2019 report, stating that 
“an exit strategy for the state-backed asset management company (AMCON) is urgently 
needed.” The Fund recommends “that AMCON stops the purchase of distressed assets, 
formally sets a sunset to its existence, earmarks its cash flows to buy back bonds, sets 
annual disposal targets, implements a plan to divest AMCON’s interests in companies and 
banks, improves its legal power to recover assets and is gradually phased out” (IMF 2019).  
18. Amendments to Relevant Regulation: The AMCON Act’s two amendments were 
unrelated to its capital injections. 
The AMCON Act was amended in 2015 and 2019. These amendments were meant to extend 
AMCON’s power as a debt restructuring and collection agency. They were focused on 
facilitating AMCON’s exit strategy related to its loan acquisition activities. The legal 
framework related to its role as a recapitalization vehicle remained unchanged (AMCON 
Amendment Act 2015; Berkeley Legal 2019). 
III. Evaluation 
AMCON’s capital injections achieved their goal of protecting depositors and ensuring that 
failing banks were not wound down (Makanjuola 2016). Critics focused on AMCON’s 
governance and lack of independence from the CBN, and lack of transparency. In 2013, two 
years after the recapitalizations, the CBN took over AMCON’s debts, leaving it to the central 
bank and potentially taxpayers to bear losses. Moreover, the government did not disclose 
how much of those losses taxpayers ultimately realized (Cerruti and Neyens, 120).  
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On the operational side, criticism focused on the guidelines issued by the CBN. Critics 
raised concerns regarding the central bank’s decision to limit the scope of AMCON’s 
activities to deposit money banks. In particular, the exclusion of the microfinance sector 
“question[ed] the CBN’s claim that its intervention was [intended] to protect depositors 
and creditors and prevent losses” (Osuji 2012). The CBN’s influence also reflected on 
AMCON’s governance. Beyond serving as the agency’s main supervisory authority and 
shareholder, the central bank nominated all four executive members of the board of 
directors, including the chief executive. Given that experience shows independence to be an 
important factor in an AMC’s success, critics raised the question whether “these powers […] 
[compromised] its mission of attaining financial stability” (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The 
issues related to AMCON’s independence were further exacerbated due to concerns 
regarding AMCON’s ability to conduct its operations. One source noted that “AMCON 
apparently lack[ed] persons with specialist skills including credit and transaction risk 
management” (Osuji 2012). On AMCON’s independence the source observed that “AMCON’s 
board lack[ed] sufficient suggestions of independence to withstand political and other 
pressures” and “AMCON [was] practically an arm of the CBN” (Osuji 2012). 
The IMF criticized AMCON for its lack of an explicit exit strategy. The IMF recognized the 
agency’s contribution in restoring stability in the banking sector. However, it voiced 
concerns regarding the absence of a sunset provision for AMCON’s activities. In a 2013 
report, the Fund recommended that a “credible exit strategy [should be] devised to ensure 
a smooth winding up of its operations by end-2017” (IMF 2013). The IMF considered an 
explicit sunset date “important to minimize fiscal risks and avoid potential moral hazard 
behavior by the banks” (IMF 2013). It reiterated its criticism in a 2019 report, stating that 
“an exit strategy for the state-backed asset management company (AMCON) is urgently 
needed.” The Fund recommended “that AMCON stops the purchase of distressed assets, 
formally sets a sunset to its existence, earmarks its cash flows to buy back bonds, sets 
annual disposal targets, implements a plan to divest AMCON’s interests in companies and 
banks, improves its legal power to recover assets and is gradually phased out” (IMF 2019). 
Finally, there were concerns regarding the manner in which AMCON absorbed losses from 
its loan purchases and bank recapitalization activities and the eventual allocation of those 
losses. A World Bank study noted that the program restored banks’ capital, but “the 
negative equity losses were transferred into the AMC with no expectation of recovery, 
rather than being allocated to banks’ shareholders, depositors, and creditors” (Cerruti and 
Neyens 2016). By the end of 2014, AMCON’s accounts showed a negative equity position of 
₦3.6 trillion due to its loss absorption program (AMCON 2012; Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
The resulting debt “was initially designed to be paid first from the proceeds of asset sales, 
with any remaining balance to be repaid out of the Banking Sector Resolution Cost Fund” 
(Cerruti and Neyens 2016). In 2015, AMCON announced that it had recovered 57% of its 
eligible asset portfolio for a total of ₦1 trillion in recovered funds (Osae-Brown 2019; 
Wallace 2015). However, it maintained a large amount of NPLs on its balance sheet, and 
further losses accumulated from its bank recapitalization operations. Exact information on 
the return on the equity held in the five intervened banks is unavailable. The exit deals for 
the bridge banks yielded a return far below AMCON’s initial investment. Given the ₦1.5 
trillion ceiling on the RCF, it appeared that a large share of the losses would eventually be 
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transferred to the government (Makanjuola 2016). “Repayment of the recapitalization 
costs is now a matter for the CBN and potentially a fiscal issue” (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
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